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Abstract 5 
In this paper, by drawing on primary empirical data obtained through 62 interviews in 6 
seven case studies we seek to offer a Marxist historical-geographical analysis of 7 
biodiversity offsetting policy in England, and its emergence in the context of the 8 
global economic crisis, and government aspirations for large-scale urban development 9 
projects. By paying attention to the interplay between offsetting, urbanization and the 10 
neoliberal reconstruction of conservation, we aim to extend the focus of the neoliberal 11 
conservation literature from the role of offsets as ecological ‘commodities’ to the way 12 
offsetting is used to support the production of space(s), place(s) and nature(s) in line 13 
with contemporary patterns of capitalist urban growth. In particular, we show how 14 
offsetting operationalized new ideas about nature as a stock of biodiversity, how it 15 
streamlined planning to support extended urbanization, how it foreclosed public 16 
debate about controversial urban development projects, and how it reterritorialized 17 
nature-society relationships. We also give a central role to social contestation against 18 
the implementation of offsetting in England, drawing attention to its class character 19 
and highlighting the potential for a new emancipatory politics that would encompass a 20 
‘right to nature’ as a key element of struggles for the ‘right to the city’. 21 
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 2 
1. Introduction 26 
‘Our economy cannot afford planning processes that deal with biodiversity 27 
expensively and inefficiently or block the housing and infrastructure our economy 28 
needs to grow. Fortunately, as the Ecosystem Market Task Force and Natural Capital 29 
Committee have set out, there is a way we can make our planning system even better 30 
for the environment and developers: biodiversity offsetting’ 31 
Owen Paterson, Former Secretary of State for the Environment (Defra, 2013)  32 
  33 
‘If you are a developer offsetting is a wonderful “get out of jail” free card’. 34 
STOP HS2 campaigner 35 
 36 
Since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash, governmental policy in the UK has 37 
moved decisively to reduce public budgetary deficits, ushering in an era of prolonged 38 
austerity. The attempt to complete the ‘unfinished neoliberal revolution’ started over 39 
three decades before (Hodkinson and Robbins, 2013: 4), instituted, in line with 40 
similar developments across the globe (Cahill, 2011, Harvey, 2011, Peck et al., 2012), 41 
renewed privatization and marketization of public services, public property and 42 
natural resources, fiscal austerity and socially regressive cuts in public spending and 43 
welfare (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010). This trend has continued and intensified. 44 
According to the rhetoric of both the Coalition Government elected in 2010
1
 and the 45 
Conservative Government that followed it in 2015, the way out of the economic 46 
recession was to be found in a combination of fiscal austerity and initiatives to 47 
stimulate economic growth through further urban development, especially large 48 
housing and infrastructure projects.  49 
 50 
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In the UK, the housing market was considered as one of the biggest casualties of the 51 
2008 global economic crisis. Not surprisingly, both the Coalition government and the 52 
Conservative Government identified the rapid delivery of housing as a key priority
2
. 53 
To this end they put pressure on local authorities to release more land (Lockhart, 54 
2015) while emphasizing the urgency to cut ‘red tape’ and remove ‘unnecessarily 55 
complex regulations’3. This was also expected to facilitate the approval of 56 
infrastructure ‘megaprojects’4, such as railways, highways, and airports. Such 57 
schemes, and the role of private sector contractors in design and construction, are 58 
characteristic of neoliberal capitalism (Flyberg, 2003, Geddes, 2012) and in the 59 
context of the crisis, their transformation into an asset class that can yield substantial 60 
profits has intensified substantially (Hildyard, 2012). 61 
 62 
The UK applied the usual nostrums of neoliberal economics to urban affairs. The 63 
intensification of neoliberal urbanization (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, Harvey, 2012, 64 
Leitner et al., 2007, Swyngedouw et al., 2002) meant an extensive deregulation of 65 
land and property markets, the minimization of state interventions in planning and 66 
environmental legislation, further fiscal constraints and budgetary cuts upon local 67 
governments and cities, and an increasing reliance on private means of sustaining 68 
social reproduction. 69 
 70 
It is within this context that biodiversity offsetting emerged in the UK
5
, as a measure 71 
at the heart of the new governmental regime for development and environmental 72 
protection set out in a series of key policy documents (e.g. Defra, 2011, 2013, NPPF, 73 
2012). The government defined biodiversity offsets as ‘conservation activities that are 74 
designed to give biodiversity benefits to compensate for losses - ensuring that when a 75 
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development damages nature (and this damage cannot be avoided or mitigated) new 76 
nature sites will be created’6.  77 
 78 
Biodiversity offsetting is a paradigmatic neoliberal policy and part of the wider shift 79 
towards market-based conservation (Lockhart, 2015, Spash, 2015, Sullivan, 2013). 80 
Offsetting seeks to compensate losses to biodiversity in one place 81 
(and at one time) by creating equivalent gains elsewhere (Apostolopoulou and 82 
Adams, 2017). Its potential to facilitate the relocation of environmental compensation 83 
across space and time in line with the interests of developers has brought together 84 
major industries (particularly housing, mining, infrastructure, construction, oil and 85 
gas), governments, environmental brokers, investors, and NGOs (ten Kate et al., 86 
2004) across the globe. Similarly, its adoption in the UK in the aftermath of the 2008 87 
financial crash was directly related to the Coalition government’s recognition of the 88 
need to free up environmentally valuable land for urban development (Defra, 2013
7
, 89 
HM Government, 2013) and address urbanization’s increasing environmental impacts 90 
(Latimer and Hill, 2007) simultaneously. The idea was that offsetting would be the 91 
end point in a ‘mitigation hierarchy’ that developers should follow only be undertaken 92 
once all possible measures to avoid or mitigate impacts had been taken (BBOP, 2009, 93 
Defra, 2013). However, experimentation with the policy triggered debates across the 94 
country on its scientific base and its effects on development decisions. Some cases, 95 
such as the Lodge Hill housing development in Kent or the new HS2 London-96 
Birmingham train line, raised strong opposition that directly challenged the 97 
government’s new ‘win-win’ rhetoric8.  98 
 99 
 5 
Critical scholars have so far analyzed the role of Defra offsetting metrics in the 100 
construction of exchangeability (Sullivan, 2013); the ideological dimensions of 101 
struggles over offsetting (Sullivan and Hannis, 2015); its use in the English planning 102 
system (Hannis and Sullivan, 2012) and the difficulty of delivering the promise of 103 
reconciling development and conservation (Lockhart, 2015). Here, by drawing on 104 
fieldwork across England we seek to contribute to existing analyses by offering a 105 
Marxist historical-geographical analysis (c.f. Harvey, 2011) of biodiversity 106 
offsetting’s emergence and operation. Our starting point is the way the adoption of 107 
biodiversity offsetting relates to government responses to the economic crisis, and 108 
their aspirations for large-scale housing and infrastructure projects. By paying 109 
attention to the interplay between biodiversity offsetting, urbanization and the 110 
neoliberal reconstruction of conservation, we aim to extend the focus of the neoliberal 111 
conservation literature from the role of offsets as ecological ‘commodities’ (Büscher 112 
et al., 2012, Sullivan, 2013) to the way offsetting is used to support the production of 113 
space(s), place(s) and nature(s) in line with contemporary patterns of capitalist urban 114 
growth. In particular, we explore the ways in which biodiversity offsetting 115 
operationalized new ideas about non-human nature as a stock of biodiversity, how it 116 
allowed planning decisions to be streamlined to support extended urbanization, how it 117 
contributed to foreclosing public debate about controversial urban development 118 
projects, and how it reterritorialized nature-society relationships. We also consider its 119 
social and class implications by showing how the hegemonic rhetoric of offsetting, as 120 
primarily shaped by governments and the private sector, has been contested by local 121 
communities and environmental activists.  122 
 123 
 6 
By drawing attention on the way offsetting links the exploitation of non-human nature 124 
in the city and in the countryside and by adopting a Lefebvrian conception of 125 
urbanization, we aim to contribute to recent attempts to bring closer Urban Political 126 
Ecology and Political Ecology (e.g. Arboleda, 2015). We furthermore suggest that 127 
struggles against offsetting (even when apparently ‘rural’) may reflect the emergence 128 
of a new emancipatory politics that would encompass the ‘right to nature’, which we 129 
define as the right to influence and command the processes by which nature-society 130 
relationships are made, remade and disrupted by generalised urbanization and 131 
economic development, as a key element of struggles for the ‘right to the city’ 132 
(Harvey, 2008, 2012, Lefebvre, 1968, 1996).            133 
 134 
2. Theoretical framework 135 
 ‘Under the banner of progress, capitalism attempts the urbanization of the 136 
countryside’ 137 
Smith (2010: 71) 138 
The introduction of biodiversity offsetting in England needs to be understood in the 139 
context of processes of urbanization. The UK is one of the world’s most urbanized 140 
countries mainly due to its early industrial development, with 82 per cent of the total 141 
population urban
9
 despite a substantial counter-urbanization movement in recent 142 
decades. In linking biodiversity offsetting and urbanization, we are reflecting long-143 
standing calls for an integrated analysis of the linked political economies of urban and 144 
rural space (Hoggart, 1995, Urry, 1995), and on the importance of links between 145 
urban and rural nature and its conservation (Matless, 1998, Sheail, 1981).   146 
 147 
 7 
We understand the term ‘urban’ in relation to the theory of capital accumulation and 148 
thus we use it to refer to the broad process of the creation of a material physical 149 
infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange and consumption (Harvey, 2012), 150 
and as such not confined to ‘cities’ (Harvey, 1996a). We follow the Lefebvrian 151 
process-oriented view of ‘generalised urbanisation’ (Lefebvre, 1970)10, to describe the 152 
multiscalar production and reproduction of the built environment regardless of 153 
population size or density (see also Arboleda, 2016, Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2015, 154 
Brenner and Schmid, 2015). Crucially, as Brenner (2013: 87) argues, generalised or 155 
extended urbanization involves new, increasingly large-scale morphologies that 156 
‘perforate, crosscut, and ultimately explode the erstwhile urban/rural divide’.  157 
 158 
Capitalist urbanization has always rested on uneven socio-ecological interactions and 159 
transformations. Policies that promote urban development and growth favor 160 
speculative capital over people and nature; what is defined as ‘success’ in terms of 161 
capital accumulation can have significant negative impacts on people (apart from a 162 
privileged class) and the environment (Harvey, 2012). The way nature is produced 163 
through urbanization is the focus of ‘urban political ecology’ (Heynen et al., 2005; 164 
Loftus, 2012; Swyngedouw, 1996). The field has been strongly shaped by Marxist 165 
logic, especially by the work of David Harvey (1996b) and by Neil Smith’s 166 
‘production of nature’ thesis (2010) and has significantly contributed to urbanizing 167 
discussions of social-ecological metabolism (Stoffwechsel) (Heynen, 2013, Smith, 168 
2005; see also Foster, 1999, Marx, 1894). As Swyngedouw (2015: 609-610) argues, 169 
the key issue is ‘the capitalist form of urbanization of natures: the process through 170 
which all manner of nonhuman “stuff” is socially mobilized, discursively scripted, 171 
imagined, economically enrolled (commodified), and physically 172 
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metabolized/transformed to produce socio-ecological assemblages that support the 173 
urbanization process’. 174 
 175 
Urban political ecology has approached the city as the key terrain for exploring the 176 
co-production of the social and the natural. However, in the context of generalised or 177 
extended urbanization, the way nature is produced through capitalist urbanization 178 
becomes increasingly relevant for many places that extend beyond the limits of the 179 
traditional ‘city’, in the form of infrastructure, housing, industrial or commercial 180 
development (Smith, 2010). Indeed, erstwhile ‘rural’ or ‘wild’ spaces are increasingly 181 
socially and environmentally transformed to serve the growth imperatives of an 182 
accelerating urbanization which extends beyond the limits of the ‘historical central 183 
city’ in the form of new ‘outer’ and ‘edge’ cities in what were formerly suburban 184 
fringes, in green field or rural sites and city regions (see Brenner and Schmid, 2015). 185 
These processes have profound implications for the implicated socionatures, reflected 186 
in recent arguments about the importance of urbanization for wider political ecologies 187 
(Arboleda, 2016, Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2015). 188 
 189 
In order to understand the way that biodiversity offsetting influences the social-190 
ecological transformations that urbanization brings about, both within and also 191 
beyond the ‘city’, it is necessary to consider its origins and characteristics. On the one 192 
hand, the existence of the offset site shows that nature is no longer an ‘open frontier’ 193 
for capitalism (Katz, 1998). Developers have to compensate for the destruction of 194 
non-human nature by re-creating nature somewhere else. However, the way 195 
compensation is understood and calculated in offsetting (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 196 
2017), along with the fact that hitherto ‘protected’ natures or ecosystems of high 197 
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biodiversity value are not excluded from the process, corroborates the contradictory 198 
and ephemeral character of conservation under capitalism (Apostolopoulou and 199 
Adams, 2015). On the other hand, offsetting also shows that mainstream solutions to 200 
the environmental contradictions of capitalism tend to reproduce the same logic that 201 
created these contradictions in the first place. The increasing reliance on offsetting 202 
policies (both carbon and biodiversity) is a key part of the wider shift towards a 203 
‘green economy’ (or ‘green’ capitalism), in the sense of the systematic application of 204 
market logic and market-based mechanisms to environmental management and 205 
governance (Corson et al., 2013). In the logic of market environmentalism, the 206 
delivery of inadequate compensation is the result of ‘market failure’ (Bayon et al., 207 
2008), leading to moves to place an economic value on biodiversity and ecosystem 208 
services. Biodiversity offsetting is also tightly interwoven with the deregulation and 209 
the market friendly reregulation of environmental and planning legislation, both key 210 
processes in the neoliberalization of non-human nature (Castree, 2008).  211 
 212 
The way urbanization and offsetting intertwine is also important from the perspective 213 
of social and environmental struggles. The ‘right to the city’ (Harvey, 2008, 2012, 214 
Lefebvre 1968, 1996, Purcell, 2002), defined as the right to claim some kind of 215 
shaping power in fundamental and radical ways over the process of urbanization 216 
(Harvey, 2012), has been inextricably linked to what kind of relationship to nature we 217 
desire (Harvey, 2008). Fights for access to public green spaces have always been at 218 
the core of many urban struggles. As urbanization extends beyond the limits of the 219 
traditional city and policies like biodiversity offsetting are being launched to address 220 
its increasing environmental impacts, new close links between urban and rural 221 
struggles are being created for three main reasons. First, offsetting explicitly links the 222 
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dynamics of urban expansion into the countryside to processes of the loss and creation 223 
of nature beyond the traditional city. Second, offsetting can be applied to 224 
development in rural areas in ways that are tightly linked to processes of urban 225 
production and consumption (e.g. fracking or mining). Third, offsetting can link the 226 
survival of public green spaces within existing urban boundaries to the survival of 227 
nature on the urban fringe or beyond. ‘Offsite compensation’ means that the 228 
development site can be an urban place and the offset site a rural place, or the reverse 229 
(although this is less common).  230 
 231 
3. Methodology  232 
Our analysis draws on 62 semi-structured interviews at national level, and in seven 233 
selected case studies (Table 1): i) 18 respondents involved in the establishment of 234 
biodiversity offsetting at national level, including conservation scientists, 235 
environmentalists, conservation bankers, consultants, and governmental officials; ii) 236 
27 respondents from local authorities, environmental administrations, private sector 237 
organizations, businesses, and NGOs; and iii) 17 respondents from civil society 238 
groups (Table 1). In line with our research objectives our aim was to select case 239 
studies where the link between urbanization and the introduction of offsetting was 240 
clear and also on areas where significant conflicts had arisen over the implementation 241 
of the proposed development and the delivery of compensation through offsetting. We 242 
thus included two of the Defra pilots and five other prominent projects (Table 1). 243 
[TABLE 1] 244 
Our interview guide consisted of two main parts: a general set of questions about 245 
offsetting that was common for every interviewee and a more detailed set referring to 246 
a specific case study. The general set was divided into five categories: (i) biodiversity 247 
 11 
offsetting policy in England and Defra’s consultation document; (ii) the relationship 248 
between conservation and urban development and the role of offsetting; (iii) offset 249 
metrics and the equivalence of ecosystems and places; (iv) the implementation of 250 
offsetting in practice; (v) and questions about offsetting, conservation banking and 251 
market-based conservation. The more detailed set of questions explored how exactly 252 
offsetting has been implemented in each case study, the actors involved, the criteria 253 
used for the designation of the offsets, how offsetting influenced the planning process 254 
as well as issues related to rights of way, access to nature, and public participation.  255 
 256 
Contacts were identified from reports and the Internet, and interviewees found 257 
through snowballing. Interviews were mostly with one person, some pairs of 258 
interviewees; seven were group interviews. Interviews lasted from 40 to 150 minutes, 259 
with one hour being the norm. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed 260 
verbatim. Notes were taken in parallel, and backed up by document analysis, and 261 
participation in local meetings. Verbatim interview quotes used in this paper are 262 
identified by letter codes (Appendix 1). 263 
 264 
4. Urbanization, neoliberalism and biodiversity offsetting in England 265 
4.1. Biodiversity offsetting, neoliberal conservation and urban development: 266 
reframing non-human nature as a movable stock of biodiversity units 267 
Even though the first explorations of the concept of biodiversity offsetting started 268 
under the Labour government elected in 2007, as part of the discussions about the 269 
creation of new biodiversity markets (Adams et al., 2014, Defra, 2007, Lockhart, 270 
2015, Treweek et al., 2009), it was the Coalition government elected in 2010 which 271 
brought forward more specific proposals. The most important policy initiative was the 272 
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introduction of an experimental two-year scheme in 2012 consisting of six pilot areas 273 
in England (Devon; Doncaster; Essex; Greater Norwich; Nottinghamshire; 274 
Warwickshire, Coventry and Solihull). Construction companies, extractive industries, 275 
and ecological consulting firms were key participants to the scheme along with local 276 
authorities and NGOs (Carver, 2015) manifesting the willingness of the Government 277 
to make clear offsetting’s pro-development character. Experimentation with offsetting 278 
was not, however, limited in the pilots: in many other areas, developers began testing 279 
its potential to compensate for the impacts of urban development projects.  280 
 281 
The same year, the Environment Bank (EB), the first private compensation brokering 282 
and consultation company in the UK
11
 and a keen supporter of offsetting, launched 283 
the Environmental Markets Exchange (EME) to provide a ‘one-stop-shop’ for the 284 
registration of offset sites and the measurement of their credit value (Environment 285 
Bank, 2012). The Environment Bank had strong links with the State (its founder was 286 
a Board Member of Natural England and of the Joint Nature Conservation 287 
Committee) and the Government: 288 
‘During the early part of 2009 we contacted the Conservative Party to provide advice 289 
on ‘biobanking’ […] The reception we were given was tremendous and the concept 290 
‘Conservation Credits’ found its way into the Conservative Party manifesto 291 
(Environment Bank 2010
12)’. 292 
The Bank hoped that the EME would pave the way for an offsetting market and 293 
formed partnerships with AB Agri (the agricultural division of Associated British 294 
Foods) to identify more offset sites and with Shell Foundation to pilot the use of 295 
credits
13
.  296 
 297 
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A key step in the attempt to reframe non-human nature as a movable stock of 298 
biodiversity was the publication of a government Green Paper on biodiversity offsets 299 
(Defra, 2013) in 2013. This set out a metric whose scope was to quantify habitat value 300 
on the basis of distinctiveness, quality and area in hectares, and calculate it in 301 
‘biodiversity units’ (Table 2). It was hoped that the conversion of an assessment of 302 
overall biodiversity into ‘units’ would emphasize ‘biodiversity per se’ rather than the 303 
value of the benefits flowing from biodiversity, which was considered to be ‘highly 304 
geographically specific’ and difficult to measure (HM Government, 2013: 9). This 305 
was in line with the fact that offsetting’s primary aim was to keep the overall ‘stock’ 306 
of biodiversity constant by achieving a quantitative balance of biodiversity lost due to 307 
development and ‘saved’ through offsetting echoing the new emphasis of UK 308 
conservation on the maintenance of the country’s ‘natural capital’. 309 
[TABLE 2] 310 
The aim to use standardized and strictly quantitative descriptions of biodiversity, 311 
along with Defra’s constant search for ‘simplicity’ and ‘efficiency’, undermined even 312 
the Scoping Study on which the metric had been based: 313 
‘The scoping report was a very preliminary version. It was developed incredibly fast 314 
and there’s been no follow-up to actually underpin it and test the metric itself. All the 315 
pilots were concerned more with how to make the metric attractive to developers 316 
rather than actually look at it’ (Interview CE1). 317 
 318 
Indeed, Defra (2013) promised that its metric would allow complex ecosystem 319 
processes to be measured ‘in as little as 20 minutes’ creating serious concerns about 320 
the quality of the whole process: 321 
‘Firstly we had to assess the proposed offset site. We couldn’t do it at the optimal 322 
time, we had to do it in a very sort of narrow window because the argument was that 323 
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the developer was losing money as time was passing by. So it may look like it might 324 
be suitable but you don't know. There may be a protected species on it, there may be 325 
something good there already, you don’t want to change it, who knows?’ (Interview 326 
ENGO1).  327 
The short time frame within which calculations had to be made to justify the use of 328 
offsetting, along with the fact that the metric was based on several problematic 329 
assumptions, including considering habitat area as a proxy of unmeasurable 330 
biodiversity, received strong criticism: 331 
‘This turns up to be a very crude way of measuring impacts. There's nothing about 332 
species or connectivity in the metric, there’s nothing about edge effects.  […] In one 333 
reserve recently there was a developer building a block of flats. Literally the reserve 334 
is here and the block of flats is just next to it. And as far as biodiversity offsetting 335 
goes because it’s outside of the footprint of the development there would be no 336 
impact’ (Interview CS2). 337 
 338 
Several interviewees provided evidence on the subjectivity involved in the offsetting 339 
process mentioning cases where interpretations of what constituted an ‘acceptable’ 340 
trade, or whether it was technically feasible to restore habitats lost due to 341 
development differed substantially. Characteristic examples included whether ancient 342 
woodlands on the HS2 train route could be compensated by planting new woodlands 343 
and whether nightingale breeding habitat could be successfully recreated to 344 
compensate for losses from the housing development at Lodge Hill.  345 
 346 
Worries were also expressed about questions of local distinctiveness, and the 347 
possibility that balancing losses and gains at a national scale would lead to the 348 
creation of standardized habitats everywhere, and possibly the cheapest ones to 349 
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recreate. In Lodge Hill, for example, the offset metric calculation showed that nature 350 
to be lost was of high biodiversity value and that offsetting would demand extensive 351 
land acquisition and management. Developers initially proposed to use offsetting at 352 
the time of seeking planning permission, but they subsequently abandoned it because 353 
of the cost: 354 
‘…We used the Defra metrics and the figures we were getting were higher and higher 355 
and higher - our clients just said “well this is just getting ridiculous and out of hand, 356 
we need a more realistic, common sense approach to the offsetting of this’ (Interview 357 
CE2). 358 
This opportunistic behavior of developers was mentioned by several interviewees as a 359 
key reason for the failure of many of the Defra pilots: 360 
‘In a sense you had to convince developers that impact assessments would be 361 
straightforward and fast otherwise they could see no scope in getting involved. I think 362 
this was why the Environment Bank launched its calculator and its guidelines for 363 
developers; it makes ecology to look like super-easy accounting’ (ENGO2). 364 
 365 
For some interviewees, the representation of biodiversity in terms of simply defined, 366 
priced units was offsetting’s strong asset since it provided a basis for the economic 367 
valuation of biodiversity and ecosystem services. For others, this was deeply 368 
problematic since it was seen as equating the value (meaning the use value) of nature 369 
with a price (the exchange value) deepening the commodification and privatization of 370 
non-human nature:  371 
‘Putting a price to nature or creating an Environment ‘Bank’ means that someone 372 
could make a massive business out of biodiversity offsetting. But nature is not a 373 
commodity, you cannot buy nature – because who does nature belong to at the end of 374 
the day? It belongs to everyone’ (Interview HS1). 375 
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 376 
4.2. Streamlining planning through biodiversity offsetting to support extended 377 
urbanization  378 
A key part of government plans for promoting urban development post 2010 was the 379 
restructuring of the planning system. The National Planning Policy Framework 380 
(NPFF) introduced in 2012 included a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable 381 
development’ which would run as ‘a golden thread’ through both plan- and decision-382 
making (NPFF, 2012: 3, 4, 13, 28, 37, 46). This presumption was described ‘as a way 383 
of cutting back on red tape and endless planning documents to focus on what people 384 
care about: local roads, schools and homes that meet their needs’14. In all our cases 385 
studies, this was translated on the ground as a clear encouragement of housebuilding 386 
and other forms of urban development, including large infrastructure projects (see 387 
Table 1). This explicit prioritization of further urban growth inevitably involved 388 
severe environmental impacts, including alterations to the Green Belt
15
 boundaries (as 389 
happened for example in our case study in North Tyneside, on the grounds that the 390 
‘objectively’ assessed housing needs, constituted ‘an exceptional circumstance’16), 391 
and expansion of urban development into greenfield areas and the countryside. In 392 
Kent, respondents commented: 393 
‘Only during the last month we’ve got a bid on a green valley which is an area of 394 
local landscape importance for about 480 houses. And just last week there’s another 395 
one for about the same number, 470 …. on some green farmland’ (Interview LH1). 396 
& 397 
‘Developers already held permission to build almost 7,000 houses yet they were 398 
sitting on them because they’re in brownfield sites and they don’t want to build them 399 
because it would be much better getting Lodge Hill, a greenfield site’ (Interview 400 
LH2).  401 
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 402 
Biodiversity offsetting was understood by all our respondents as an integral part of the 403 
above reforms:  404 
 ‘Offsetting clearly relates to the new Local Plans, to all the land release that the 405 
government plans to enable; the greenbelt release sites that are coming up. Because 406 
there would be lots of ecological issues on those that they think can be achieved from 407 
offsetting’ (Interview LA1). 408 
& 409 
‘The local plan was almost a blank cheque being written for development. The 410 
developers saw it and thought ‘get in, we can do that’. Three speculative applications 411 
came up immediately - all of them on sites that are environmentally sensitive and all 412 
of them mentioned biodiversity offsetting’ (Interview NT1). 413 
 414 
The government’s view of controls over planning as ‘environmental red tape’ and 415 
‘unnecessary bureaucracy’, along with their belief in markets instead of state 416 
regulation, rendered neoliberal conservation policies such as offsetting particularly 417 
attractive. The policy was explicitly framed as capable of making the process of 418 
granting planning permission and delivering biodiversity requirements more 419 
development-friendly showing that the government’s main concern was to unblock 420 
development from environmental constraints (see also CIWEM, 2013
17
) and to 421 
legitimize the expansion of urbanization into rural areas under the banner of ‘No Net 422 
Loss’.  423 
 424 
The Environment Bank (EB) and the Ecosystem Markets Task Force (EMTF) took an 425 
almost identical line of argument and tried to attract developers to offsetting by 426 
reassuring them that the whole process could save them both time and money through 427 
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reduced risk and uncertainty, streamline planning approval, enable access to land and 428 
bring reputational benefits (EMTF, 2013, Environment Bank, 2014, 2016a). 429 
Developers were advised that any upfront costs would be factored into residual land 430 
values which would be substantially uplifted as a result of planning permits (see also 431 
Duke et al., 2013, EMTF, 2013).  432 
 433 
Not surprisingly, most interviewees saw such streamlining of planning approval as 434 
offsetting’s main purpose. As a local authority planner with more than two decades of 435 
experience put it:  436 
‘It seemed the government proposed offsetting to loosen up, cut away the constraints 437 
of planning and the terrible red tape that we, the enemies of enterprise (laughing), 438 
impose’ (Interview LA2).  439 
Similarly, an interviewee from a conservation NGO commented: 440 
‘During initial discussion on offsetting as an innovative, novel, approach, we were 441 
suddenly faced with the fact…. that for many, including the Treasury, this was not at 442 
all about compensation, it was about speeding up development’ (Interview ENGO3). 443 
 444 
The role that the UK government expected offsetting to play in supporting urban 445 
development, and the expectations it created in interested parties, are well 446 
demonstrated by the Essex Pilot. A member of the Steering Committee explained that 447 
Essex was selected as a pilot because it was expected that the South of the County 448 
would be the focus of significant large-scale housing and industrial developments. 449 
The County Council, advised by the Environment Bank, proposed a broker-led 450 
scheme:  451 
‘We got a pilot officer paid for by the Environment Bank, that was quite unusual. Her 452 
job really was as a kind of marketing exercise to encourage developers to try 453 
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offsetting, speak to planners to try and get them familiar with the process and 454 
landowners to see if they might like to register offset sites’ (Interview LA3). 455 
The critical attraction for developers was that:  456 
‘…offsetting would save them money in simplifying the process and reducing those 457 
meetings with the planning authority’ (Interview LA4). 458 
Offsetting’s pro-development character was also a key element of the offsetting 459 
strategy in the Warwickshire Pilot, where the main goal, a conservation broker 460 
explained to us, was to convince developers that ‘a balanced playing field’ for them 461 
could be created (Interview CB1). 462 
 463 
Crucially, offsetting is a form of compensation for loss that cannot be avoided or 464 
mitigated on site and thus the NPPF (2012, para 118) sees it as an option that may 465 
avoid refusal of permission
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. Local community opponents of attempts to use 466 
offsetting to respond to an initial refusal of planning permission explained to us that 467 
offsetting played into the hands of developers, giving them ‘an excuse to do what they 468 
want and then use biodiversity offsetting as a tool to compensate afterwards’ 469 
(Interview CG1). 470 
 471 
The way in which offsetting can be used to ease the granting of planning permission 472 
is shown by the application by Bellway Homes to North Tyneside Council for 366 473 
executive homes at White House Farm, West Moor, Killingworth. This was refused in 474 
April 2012, in part due to its adverse indirect impacts on biodiversity in the 475 
neighboring designated wildlife corridor and Gosforth Park SSSI, as well as an 476 
adjacent Site of Local Conservation Interest. The applicant appealed, citing a scoping 477 
report prepared by the Environment Bank that the creation of an offset site would be 478 
sufficient to address the extensive biodiversity impacts. In September 2013, the 479 
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Secretary of State granted planning permission, subject to a condition specifying the 480 
offset. As one representative of a local NGO explained to us: 481 
‘When we walked into the room the first words the developers said was: ‘We are not 482 
here to talk about a 106 agreement, that is something that is not on the table, we are 483 
going to go with the offsetting’. We were surprised by their insistence but then we 484 
thought they felt that they could gain planning permission by shifting the discussion 485 
around a new, powerful (in their minds) idea. But also because no one had really 486 
done it before they could almost set the rules and there was no real guidance. And 487 
this is what happened: their application gained approval due to the offsetting 488 
proposal’ (Interview ENGO4). 489 
 490 
Sometimes, the very existence of offsetting led to an underuse of the mitigation 491 
hierarchy’s earlier stages. The case of housing development at Lodge Hill was 492 
repeatedly mentioned during our interviews as an example of this:  493 
‘Our concern is that the Government tried to circumvent the common mitigation 494 
hierarchy and make it easy for developers to proceed on the basis that they could 495 
compensate. This is what happened in Lodge Hill. The decision as to whether or not 496 
you should offset is entirely dependent on whether or not you can avoid the harm but 497 
they never seriously discussed that. And the NPPS also says the first step is to 498 
examine the alternatives, but they haven’t done that either. So, how a council can 499 
vote to approve something when all that information is missing?’ (Interview 500 
ENGO5). 501 
 502 
However, the strategic use of offsetting to gain permission did not always succeed. In 503 
the Coventry Gateway, Warwick Council favoured development and suggested 504 
alterations of the Green Belt to allow it, accepting that the developer’s proposed offset 505 
would offer sufficient compensation. However, the Secretary of the State called in the 506 
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proposal and rejected it, inter alia on the grounds of its severe environmental impacts. 507 
The Secretary recognised that offsetting could not fully address development impacts, 508 
including the permanent loss of Green Belt, and the loss of the intrinsic character of 509 
the countryside. This was one of the decisions which vindicated the struggle of local 510 
residents opposing the development on the grounds of its economic, environmental, 511 
public health and social impacts. 512 
 513 
4.3. Foreclosing the public debate on the impacts of controversial urban 514 
development projects  515 
The NPPF also reflected the government’s political agenda of localism (HM 516 
Government, 2010, Maclennan and O’Sullivan, 2013) by reinforcing the status of 517 
Local Plans. Local Plans set out ‘a vision and a framework’ for future development 518 
that frame consideration of individual planning applications
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. The Government 519 
hoped that a tight link would be established between local interests and support for 520 
urban growth, an effect of austerity localism (Apostolopoulou et al., 2014, 521 
Featherstone et al., 2012). The key claim was that a combination of autonomy and 522 
specific incentives would unleash a desire to enable development (Cowell, 2013, 523 
Conservative Party, 2010). As Allmendinger and Haughton (2013) argue, the 524 
transition from spatial planning to localism, constitutes a form of, and contributes to, 525 
neoliberal spatial governance. The ‘new’ neoliberal vision was not very different from 526 
Thatcher’s ‘forged consent’ through the cultivation of a middle class that relished the 527 
joys of home ownership, private property, individualism, and the liberation of 528 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Harvey, 2005). 529 
 530 
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Biodiversity offsetting formed part of wider processes of deregulation of planning and 531 
environmental legislation, decentralization and pro-market localism (Allmendinger 532 
and Haughton, 2013, Hannis and Sullivan, 2012) and clearly favored private funding 533 
for conservation and public-private partnerships. As became obvious from our 534 
interviews, in the context of prolonged austerity and economic recession and in the 535 
face of decreasing public budgets and increasing competition, many local councils 536 
were positive towards the idea of finding a way to speed up development while were 537 
also hoping to benefit from increased investment from offsets (Apostolopoulou, 538 
2016).  539 
 540 
Using such arguments, the government hoped to create a broad consensus on the 541 
implementation of offsetting. The rhetoric that ‘we all want development’ was 542 
continuously used by offsetting’s supporters during our interviews along with the 543 
acceptance of urban development as inevitable: 544 
‘Is the railway going to be built? Yes. Is it going to destroy ancient woodland? Yes. 545 
Can we do something about it? No. We all want development but we need to make 546 
sure that we will hit those biodiversity targets that we keep setting. Biodiversity 547 
offsetting can do exactly that’ (Interview CB2). 548 
 549 
The role of the Environment Bank was key in the manufacture of consent:  550 
‘The representative of the Environment Bank and an ecological adviser were writing 551 
the minutes of the meetings and they were focused on the consensus stuff and were 552 
really trying to make out from the minutes that there was an agreement even on areas 553 
where we completely disagreed. Many of us said ‘where did you get this notion that 554 
this was agreed? Have you got any quotes on this?’ He said he didn’t want it to turn 555 
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into who said what. […] So by the end of his report which he had to produce for the 556 
inspector we had a document that virtually was his opinion’ (Interview LH3). 557 
 558 
In other cases, offsetting was used as stratagem to shift discussion from the impacts 559 
and scope of controversial urban development projects to the narrower question of 560 
appropriate compensation, in an attempt to foreclose and depoliticize public debate 561 
(c.f. Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017, Spash, 2015): 562 
‘In North East England the population is declining but the planners still want to build 563 
more houses rather like nesting boxes to attract people in […] We had three 564 
speculative planning applications from three different developers, these were not 565 
aimed at providing houses for those people who need them but ‘executive’ 566 
homes/villas, you see social housing is out of the question these days. These are the 567 
concerns of the local population but these questions were never seriously addressed; 568 
instead we caught up in endless technical disputes about offsetting calculations’ 569 
(Interview LA5). 570 
& 571 
‘…when offsetting was put on the table, the discussion suddenly shifted from how to 572 
avoid the extensive biodiversity impacts on how we’ll find the ideal offset. This 573 
alerted us to the role they had in mind for offsetting; this wasn’t a railway, there was 574 
no overriding public interest or any other serious reason for not locating it somewhere 575 
else but the idea that we would end up with a ‘net gain’ of biodiversity changed the 576 
rules of the game: this wasn’t an environmentally destructive project any more but a 577 
blessing for our degraded countryside’ (Interview NT2). 578 
 579 
The highly technical character of discussions further disempowered many 580 
communities who lacked the expertise and money to challenge the offset calculations 581 
from consultants working for the developers. Some received help pro bono (e.g. in 582 
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North Tyneside, where local activists were helped by a Professor of Law from the 583 
University of Newcastle). Others were less fortunate or even found themselves 584 
completely excluded from negotiations in which consultants and other unelected and 585 
unaccountable commercial actors (Apostolopoulou et al., 2014) like the Environment 586 
Bank had been given a prominent role: 587 
‘We now have to deal with confidential commercial transactions over land for the 588 
creation of offsets. Negotiations were taking place between the Environment Bank 589 
and landowners and we were kept in the dark – even members of the pilot steering 590 
committee were kept in the dark. We never really know what was happening’ 591 
(Interview ES1). 592 
 & 593 
‘We started to meet regularly with the local authority, the developer, the consultants, 594 
and the Environment Bank. What was missing was any representation from the local 595 
residents despite -or maybe due to!- their strong opposition’ (Interview ENGO4). 596 
 597 
This exclusion of local people echoes Swyngedouw’s et al. (2002) observation that 598 
neoliberal urban policies and their selective ‘middle- and upper-class’ democracy are 599 
mostly associated with elite-driven priorities and an undermining of local democratic 600 
participation. 601 
 602 
4.4. The uneven reterritorialization of nature-society relationships 603 
A key feature of biodiversity offsetting for developers and the state was that the 604 
policy could potentially yield valuable net developable areas in desirable locations by 605 
favoring offsite mitigation. The results of this varied in practice. In some cases, offset 606 
sites have been selected to facilitate the concentration of areas for conservation and 607 
urban development deepening a rural/urban divide. Thus sites close to already 608 
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existing protected areas, areas of high nature value, or just places away from heavily 609 
urbanized areas, were given priority: 610 
‘If there’s an offset over the road, brilliant, but if not, this could mean that all of the 611 
green space within London will have to be pushed out to the edges’ (Interview CE4). 612 
Moreover, under a rhetoric of providing compensation ‘for nature and not for people’ 613 
(Interview CA3), and guided by the imperative to avoid costly choices and thus places 614 
which would require intensive management to keep their biodiversity targets, there 615 
was a clear preference for sites where public access would be either forbidden or 616 
restricted: 617 
‘A community park would have been a great idea for the offset site but we couldn’t 618 
bear the cost for its maintenance or the risks from a misuse of the park from its 619 
visitors’  (Interview CE5). 620 
 621 
The case of North Tyneside offers a characteristic example of the outcomes of such 622 
choices. Even though the new ‘executive’ houses would destroy one of the last green 623 
spaces in a highly urbanized area, the developer proposed to locate the offset site 624 
three miles from the development site, in an area which was in proximity to a 625 
Northumberland Wildlife Trust reserve, and which the developer already owned. The 626 
offsetting report suggested that accessing the site itself would be restricted with 627 
barriers such as ditches and hedge banks: 628 
‘They probably said “well we can do a swap, we can drive out biodiversity in this 629 
area and we’ll set up something in the middle of Northumberland” – you know the 630 
site is not in North Tyneside and is not accessible. You see that’s the whole point, 631 
city people have a right to enjoy biodiversity on their doorstep, without having to 632 
drive into the middle of nowhere’ (Interview NT3). 633 
 634 
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A similar logic prevailed at Lodge Hill, where one of the key arguments of the 635 
developer’s ecologists for locating the offset in Shoeburyness/Foulness in Essex 636 
(more than 100 miles from Lodge Hill, adjacent to Natura 2000 and Ramsar sites of 637 
the Crouch and Roach Estuaries and Foulness Coast) was the area’s ownership by the 638 
Ministry of Defense, which would prevent ‘public disturbance’: 639 
‘…one of the beauties of that site from a conservation point of view is, number one it 640 
is an island, number two is an island owned and protected by the Ministry of Defense 641 
so there is no right of public access at all which means that any nightingale 642 
compensation that we provide would be completely secured. Not subject to any 643 
disturbance’ (Interview CE3). 644 
 & 645 
‘The local population should understand that we are not providing compensation for 646 
them, we are providing it for the birds’ (Interview CE6). 647 
 648 
This was not the only occasion where offsetting’s proponents adopted a strict division 649 
between ‘nature’ and ‘people’. As a conservation broker argued, incorporating the 650 
social, historical or cultural significance of a site would ‘skew’ the biodiversity 651 
‘portion’ of the metric: 652 
‘Although the human aspect is important, we’re actually not dealing with that at the 653 
moment, we are dealing with habitats and nature. Hopefully all offsets will be within 654 
the same local authority borough so we won’t be removing people but this will be a 655 
secondary level of decision-making’ (Interview CB3). 656 
 657 
Concerns that offsetting was disconnecting nature from local communities were also 658 
expressed by the Environmental Audit Committee and from local authorities 659 
employees with long experience in planning:  660 
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‘As offsetting has been played out in practice we have seen that it is the ecologist, the 661 
consultant or the broker that have the first role in deciding the location of the sites. 662 
They all are much more amenable to a site further away from the application site 663 
because there is no measurable political cost for them for ignoring local community 664 
demands’ (Interview LA2). 665 
 666 
The way in which offsetting reproduced the asocial logic of market environmentalism 667 
to enable the relocation of non-human nature cut little ice with local activists who 668 
rejected the reductionist premises of offset calculations: 669 
‘So the whole idea of offsetting is you can take it away to more suitable locations. 670 
But for example here our woodland is not just a bit of habitat, it’s an amenity. We use 671 
it, kids use it, walkers use it, it’s a real local amenity, a part of our life. So if 672 
offsetting were done elsewhere we’d obviously be losing our amenity’ (Interview 673 
HS2). 674 
 675 
In the Coventry Gateway, the development proposal involved converting 676 
predominantly open countryside into an industrial site, resulting in the complete loss 677 
of natural habitat. The proposal was to offset existing ecosystems with a ‘country 678 
park’. As a member of the committee against the Gateway, explained: 679 
‘The Green Belt is Green Belt. And what the applicant says is we are going to build a 680 
country park where local people can have access to, so that will be your gain, you get 681 
a country park out of it… but we cannot have birds in the country park because it’s 682 
going to be around the airport: they are going to put nets over the water bodies to stop 683 
birds going there, they are going to electrocute the fish on a regular basis so there is 684 
no food for the birds…but you can walk around and look at the flowers. […] You can 685 
say to the developer: “thank you for your offer for the country park, but we don’t 686 
want it. We want the countryside that surrounds us as it is”’ (Interview CG2). 687 
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 688 
Crucially, offsetting’s rearrangement of nature to fit around the patterns of urban 689 
growth was not seen by local activists as politically or socially neutral but rather the 690 
opposite:  691 
‘Somebody having to get into a car to go and see wildlife it’s not a sustainable 692 
solution; green places are good for your soul, they are the lungs of the city. Town 693 
planning was trying to address those issues and now it seems to be about how do we 694 
grow everything? What we see is that offsetting is trying to facilitate that. But the 695 
policy is not class neutral: the same time they take away the last green space from the 696 
local community they give villas with gardens to other social classes by creating 697 
executive homes’ (Interview NT4). 698 
 699 
The idea of offsetting at a national scale also raised questions of socio-spatial 700 
unevenness across the country since it would allow developers to locate offsets: 701 
‘where it is cheapest for them: development land in the South East is very expensive. 702 
Whereas mitigation might be cheaper in the North, for example. So we risk ending up 703 
with a very uneven result’ (Interview CS1). 704 
 705 
Importantly, the location of offsets did not always follow specific criteria but has been 706 
significantly influenced by competition over land and space and hence price:  707 
‘…by talking to the landowners you automatically alert them to the fact that there is 708 
some interest for their land. As soon as the Environment Bank talked to the 709 
landowner about the proposed site he was interested, we were moving forward and 710 
then he found out that … (he mentions the developer) were involved and tripled the 711 
price’ (Interview ENGO6). 712 
 713 
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At the worst, the search for an economically realistic option could ‘just create wildlife 714 
sites somewhere randomly in the countryside’ (Interview CS3): 715 
‘When the developer realized that the proposed site was very expensive they went 716 
and looked at somewhere else but they didn’t tell anyone about it. They chose a site 717 
that we have never discussed about and which wasn’t ideal from many aspects – it 718 
even had a railway. They did that because this site was already on the market so they 719 
knew how much it was going to cost’ (Interview ENGO6). 720 
 721 
4.5. Urban development as environmental improvement: a new ‘win-win’ 722 
rhetoric for neoliberal conservation and neoliberal urbanization 723 
Many conservationists initially supported offsetting, seeing in it not only the 724 
opportunity to receive additional funding for conservation in the context of a post-725 
2008 austerity agenda (Comerford et al., 2010) but also the possibility of gaining 726 
access to new land through the creation of habitat banks. In the influential Making 727 
Space for Nature Review, Lawton et al. (2010) argued that offsets required for 728 
separate small developments could be pooled into larger habitat blocks without 729 
imposing additional burdens on developers, while also funding conservation via the 730 
sale of credits to developers (see also England Biodiversity Group, 2011). 731 
Governmental documents drawing on the Review also introduced offsetting as a 732 
means to deliver a landscape-scale approach to conservation. However, for this to 733 
succeed, governmental officials argued that offsets had to be produced according to 734 
the needs of developers to provide compensation: 735 
‘…it’s important to get the supply and demand matched. You have to be careful to 736 
avoid having people going around and looking for an offset which doesn’t exist. But 737 
equally not to encourage offset providers to be flooding the market with things that 738 
are not required’ (Interview CA1). 739 
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 740 
Conservation brokers were even more explicit agreeing the clever thing to do is to 741 
build a clear alliance between development and conservation:  742 
‘If HS2 gives 300 million pounds for environmental compensation we could have an 743 
extraordinary wood planting scheme. Would it actually replace the Ancient 744 
Woodland that has been lost? No, not in my lifetime or in my grandchild’s lifetime. 745 
But in 50 years time we could have a tremendous young wood growing in, and you 746 
see, for me, the counterfactual is that if you don’t apply offsetting for HS2 is it going 747 
to prevent HS2 from being built? No! And finding the money to build huge national 748 
forests is actually a very exciting thing to do’ (Interview CB2). 749 
 750 
The desire to make offsetting a policy that conservationists would embrace was also 751 
obvious in the decision to locate many offsets near existing PAs. This would facilitate 752 
their management by environmental NGOs potentially gaining their consensus (for 753 
example the developer in North Tyneside promised to ‘gift’ the offset land to a 754 
conservation organization): 755 
‘The last couple of years have been some of the most difficult years in my career, 756 
because everything we’d worked very hard to gain has been sort of torn up and 757 
thrown away in their search for economic growth. This is what we felt with 758 
offsetting: they increasingly imply to us that if won’t cooperate with developers then 759 
there will be no money for conservation’ (Interview ENGO4). 760 
 761 
A key part of the attempt to portray offsetting as environmentally friendly, improving 762 
inter alia the profile of the corporations that would implement it and practice their 763 
corporate social responsibility, was to prove that it was actually creating ‘better 764 
nature’ that the one that was being lost due to urbanization. The Thameslink 765 
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Programme (TLP) provides an indicative example of this. The railway route North-766 
South across London affects habitats ranging from scrub-covered railway 767 
embankments within Greater London to wooded land in open countryside. Starting 768 
from the need to compensate for biodiversity losses, particularly in rural areas, the 769 
upgrade of the line ended up being considered as delivering ‘a net gain of 770 
biodiversity’ by ‘upgrading’ habitat of lower ecological value (in areas owned by 771 
Thameslink), by planting woodland on other sites. The company even suggested that 772 
it would ‘bring nature back to London’ and succeeded in making the offset on 773 
Streatham Common in Lambeth, South London
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, (where biodiversity loss in 774 
suburban areas would be compensated), part of a complementary pilot (Collingwood 775 
Environmental Planning Limited, 2014), to test, among other things, the possibility of 776 
finding offset sites within highly urbanized contexts to compensate for development 777 
in suburban areas. Similarly, in North Tyneside, offsetting was framed by the 778 
Environment Bank as a ‘trade up’, because the development site consisted of 779 
‘common’ farmland, while the offset site would be restored to lowland meadow, a 780 
habitat expected to have higher biodiversity values, and thus be capable of delivering 781 
more credits (135.8) than needed (122.5) (Interviews CB1, CA2, ENGO6). 782 
 783 
Following the same line of argument, offsetting officers and the local council in 784 
Warwickshire argued that the long-term goal was to make offsetting a funding 785 
mechanism for improving the ‘Green Infrastructure’ of the county, and even 786 
suggested that in the future most of the biodiversity enhancement of the county would 787 
come through biodiversity offsetting. One offsetting advocate said: 788 
‘If our plan for conservation banking works we will be creating 1000 hectares of low-789 
flower meadow restoration in Warwickshire which is more than the environmental 790 
movement has ever done in any decade ever’ (Interview CB2). 791 
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This notion received strong criticism from local activists: 792 
‘The local council effectively opened the gate to potential developers, saying that 793 
‘Ah, right, if that is the view of the county council, then that’s the direction we will 794 
go with our application. If we do a biodiversity offsetting exercise we can tick the 795 
box and be good boys with the county council and all those support our planning 796 
application’ (Interview CG3). 797 
 798 
5. Discussion  799 
Lefebvre’s (1970) observation of urban areas exploding relentlessly beyond their 800 
boundaries, producing a highly uneven urban fabric that ceaselessly extends its 801 
borders across non-urban geographies, could have been written to describe the context 802 
within which biodiversity offsetting emerged in the UK. In the post-2008 period, the 803 
UK saw an expansion of urban development into the Green Belt and the wider 804 
countryside, triggering clashes between urbanization and environmental protection 805 
across the country. Within a context of prolonged austerity and by following a clearly 806 
neoliberal path, urban development has mainly served the interests of landowners and 807 
of the housing and infrastructure industry, and has often been forcefully opposed by 808 
local communities. The pressure for residential development in peri-urban and rural 809 
areas ‘has transformed the rural environment on the periphery of many of Britain’s 810 
cities into a battle ground’ (Pacione, 2013: 61). 811 
 812 
Biodiversity offsetting in the UK emerged within a context characterised by the 813 
entrenchment of neoliberal policies coupled with rampant urbanization and it was 814 
expected to facilitate urbanization, increase land availability for development and 815 
contribute in foreclosing discussion of the extent and impacts of urbanization. Despite 816 
governmental intentions, in practice, outcomes varied: offsetting in some cases failed 817 
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to stimulate or facilitate development and growth while in other cases it succeeded 818 
(and still does, see Environment Bank, 2016b). The expectations of its proponents that 819 
offsetting would unconditionally facilitate development are confirmed by the cases 820 
we documented where developers who had previously embraced offsetting, 821 
abandoned the idea once it became clear that offsets would be prohibitively expensive 822 
or difficult to find. 823 
 824 
Even though a market in biodiversity has not yet been established in the UK, the 825 
discourse of market environmentalism has strongly shaped the rhetoric of offsetting’s 826 
supporters, serving an important ideological and material role: to reframe non-human 827 
nature in line with the needs of capital (Robertson, 2006, Sullivan 2013, Sullivan and 828 
Hannis 2015), as a movable, interchangeable and asocial stock of biodiversity assets 829 
which can be exchanged across space and time corroborating political ecology’s 830 
critique of market-based (or ‘mainstream’) conservation as being materially and 831 
ideologically aligned with capitalism (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2015, Igoe et al., 832 
2010, Neumann, 2015, Neves and Igoe, 2012). Moreover, the emphasis on ‘No Net 833 
Loss’ and the choice of the word ‘offsetting’ were not coincidental. The term 834 
deliberately portrays the social and eco-spatial rearrangement of non-human nature to 835 
fit urban development, and the interests of the different sections of capital that pursue 836 
it, as socially neutral and as potentially positive for nature. Offsetting seems to offer a 837 
way in which the very processes that are responsible for biodiversity loss can become 838 
the drivers of environmental improvement. So the loss of habitat under rail lines or 839 
major residential developments across the UK can actually improve the position of 840 
nature overall (Environment Bank, 2016b). The implications of this are profound. 841 
Firstly, nature conservation is reconstituted as development-led (Hannis and Sullivan, 842 
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2012, Sullivan, 2013, Lockhart, 2016), since demand for and funding of offsets 843 
depends on environmentally harmful development. Secondly, ecosystem degradation 844 
caused by extended urbanization is now represented as a conservation opportunity 845 
(Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017) implying that the best thing for conservation in 846 
the era of the ‘Anthropocene’ is to ally with major industries.  847 
 848 
Biodiversity offsetting, therefore, seems to bring together a bundle of reactionary 849 
ideas about nature-society relationships. It deliberately frames nature as external to 850 
society and ignores both the importance of place and the profound socio-ecological 851 
transformations which urbanization involves by being based on an extreme 852 
reductionism which sees biodiversity as completely divorced from its context. In 853 
offsetting, nature is progressively produced as part of ‘second nature’ (Smith, 2010): 854 
representing non-human nature through simple numerical scores or priced credits 855 
enabled the reterritorialization of nature-society relationships in line with the patterns 856 
of an increasingly ecologically disruptive and socio-spatially uneven urban growth. 857 
As our case studies showed, this had profound implications for the involved 858 
socionatures: offsetting often deepened longstanding divisions between ‘common’ 859 
and ‘unique’ nature, protected and non-protected areas, and ultimately society and 860 
nature by favoring the creation of more ‘net development’ and more ‘net conservation 861 
areas’. It also changed the ability of different social groups to access green space, 862 
separating them from nature where they live and work. Offsetting clearly ignored 863 
social and cultural ties between communities and places and it often led to a 864 
redistribution of areas of conservation value from urban to rural areas (see also Ruhl 865 
and Salzman, 2006), ultimately creating uneven outcomes environmentally, socially 866 
and spatially (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017; Seagle, 2012) echoing Smith’s 867 
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observation that uneven development is the concrete process and pattern of the 868 
production of non-human nature under capitalism (Smith, 2010). Biodiversity 869 
offsetting is thus an indicative example of how neoliberal conservation policies 870 
designed to address the environmental contradictions of capitalism further deepen 871 
existing contradictions while also creating new ones.  872 
 873 
Importantly, in England, biodiversity offsetting needs to be understood as the product 874 
of an essentially urban policy, even where the land affected is outside existing urban 875 
limits. The priority given to urbanization means that offsetting has involved the 876 
production of nature in ways that primarily serve the interests of bid building 877 
contractors, real estate and infrastructure companies. The consequent reworking of 878 
nature reflects the way landlords and the different sections of capital govern the uses 879 
of urban and rural space for profit (Smith, 2010) testifying the class character of the 880 
policy. Offsetting acknowledged and respected the geographical specificity of 881 
urbanization and the fact that the production of space and spatial monopolies are 882 
integral to the dynamics of accumulation in the nature of the created and produced 883 
spaces and places over which commodity flows occur (Harvey, 2012: 42). It has not 884 
respected the geographical specificity of non-human nature and nature-society 885 
relationships. The urbanization of the rural in England is thus tightly interwoven with 886 
corporate interests. It also reflects a consumerist approach to nature as a destination 887 
for weekends and countryside leisure, and a frame for leafy, sprawling, suburbs (as 888 
Lefebvre 1970, 1991 has long ago observed).  889 
 890 
 However, offsetting’s limited acceptance in most of our case studies shows that 891 
‘actually existing’ neoliberal conservation does not emerge in laboratory conditions 892 
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but have to confront political, social and environmental realities that are often 893 
uncooperative. Indeed, the uneven outcomes of the production of nature out of 894 
capitalist relationships, both through neoliberal urbanization and neoliberal 895 
conservation, have met strong social opposition. This shows that as urbanization in 896 
the UK extends beyond the limits of cities into areas that were part of the Green Belt 897 
and the wider countryside transforming the landscape, struggles for the ‘right to the 898 
city’, also expand beyond the limits of the traditional city.  899 
 900 
Lefebvre predicted in La révolution urbaine (1970) that due to urbanization, the clear 901 
distinction between the urban and the rural is gradually fading into a set of porous 902 
spaces of uneven geographical development, under the hegemonic command of 903 
capital and the state (Harvey, 2008). Therefore, the right to the city for Lefebvre had 904 
to mean the right to command the whole urban process (even the production of 905 
space), which was increasingly dominating the countryside (Lefebvre, 1996). 906 
Crucially, as urbanization increasingly impacts on natural areas, it brings to the 907 
forefront environmental struggles over the quality of everyday life and access to green 908 
spaces and ecosystems. Biodiversity offsetting can be seen as part of urbanization’s 909 
‘creative destruction’ (Brenner, 2013, Lefebvre, 1970) that dispossesses the public of 910 
any right not only to the city (Harvey, 2008) but also to the production of space and 911 
nature. The interplay of offsetting and urbanization in England leaves little room for 912 
seeing nature as anything more than a good background for executive housing, as 913 
carefully planned city parks, or as protected area museums where public access is 914 
restricted polarizing humans and non-human nature into ever-more separate locations. 915 
Our interviewees, fighting speculative development and the creation of new urban 916 
enclaves, considered opposition to biodiversity offsetting a key part of their struggles 917 
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which by challenging the symbolic, material and social meanings of common urban 918 
and non-urban (green) spaces, seek to defend not only the ‘right to the city’ but also 919 
the ‘right to nature’. This suggests that the right to influence and command the 920 
processes by which nature-society relationships are made, transformed and disrupted 921 
by urbanization (and economic development), is increasingly becoming a key element 922 
of struggles against capitalist urbanization (Brenner and Schmid, 2015) and thus an 923 
integral part of struggles for the right to the city.  924 
 925 
We thus believe that the term ‘right to nature’ is crucial for the potential of the 926 
environmental movement and social struggles to challenge the extent of urbanization 927 
and neoliberal solutions to its increasing environmental impacts. This is of major 928 
political importance because it reveals that as biodiversity loss due to urbanization is 929 
increasingly related to the threatening of the quality of life of many local 930 
communities, the ‘right to nature’ (as defined in this paper) is increasingly becoming 931 
an issue of major social and political significance. Moreover, the idea of a ‘right to 932 
nature’ and to the ‘production of nature’ could provide the theoretical basis for a 933 
conservation that is not neoliberal (c.f. Büscher et al., 2012). 934 
 935 
A political ecology that purposes to understand and transform uneven socio-936 
ecological relations qua urbanisation, has to embrace the non-urban as constitutive of 937 
the urban, and understand how the former is related to the latter – and how struggles 938 
for the city and for nature in dense city cores and in seemingly ‘remote’ (rural or 939 
natural) areas (see Brenner and Schmid, 2015) are often interrelated. This has crucial 940 
implications for the political ecology of Global North. In the Marxist tradition, 941 
environmental and urban struggles are usually construed as being about issues of 942 
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reproduction rather than production, and therefore not about class, and thus dismissed 943 
as devoid of revolutionary potential or significance (Harvey, 2012). Similarly, in the 944 
neoliberal conservation literature, the emphasis often rests on protected natures or 945 
areas of high nature value and environmental struggles in the Global South. However, 946 
given that urbanization is crucial in the history of capital accumulation, then political 947 
and class struggles, no matter whether they are explicitly recognized as such, are 948 
inevitably involved (Harvey, 2012, Lefebvre, 1970) and thus the question of whose 949 
nature is or becomes urbanized, must be at the forefront of any radical political action 950 
(Heynen et al, 2005). As urbanization extends beyond cities in association with 951 
policies like biodiversity offsetting which aim to rescript natures as placeless, these 952 
struggles will increasingly involve environmental aspects. An important strategic 953 
political question that reaches well beyond our discussion here, is therefore: to what 954 
degree should anti-capitalistic struggles explicitly focus and organize on the broad 955 
terrain of the right to the production of nature as well as space?  956 
  957 
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1
 In 2010 a Labour administration was replaced by a coalition between the Conservative and 
Liberal-Democrat Parties. 
2
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-house-
building/2010-to-2015-government-policy-house-building#background 
3
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-going-further-to-cut-red-tape-by-10-
billion  
4
 Megaprojects are commonly understood to be projects that cost at least a billion dollars. 
5
 In common with other aspects of environmental policy, government approaches to offsetting 
differs across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland within a standard neoliberal 
frame established by the UK government. This paper addresses offsetting policy within 
England, where it was developed earliest and most extensively.  
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Highlights 
 Biodiversity offsetting relates to UK government’s urban development 
aspirations 
 Offsetting enables a social and spatial reterritorialization of socionatures 
 Offsetting portrays urban development as the driver of environmental 
improvement 
 Biodiversity offsetting in England is widely contested by local communities   
 Struggles for the ‘right to the city’ should expand to embrace ‘rights to nature’   
Highlights
Table 1. Background information on the seven case studies.  
Case study Basic information Civil society Groups  
Essex 
biodiversity 
offsetting pilot 
Chosen as one of the 
2012-2014 six 
national pilot areas 
to trial biodiversity 
offsetting. Various 
housing 
developments in the 
area. 
Residents 
participating in 
‘Hands off Thaxted’ 
group. 
 
Warwickshire, 
Coventry and 
Solihull 
biodiversity 
offsetting pilot 
One of the six Defra 
national pilot areas 
to trial biodiversity 
offsetting. One of the 
most advanced and 
pro-offsetting pilots. 
Local community 
groups against the 
Coventry 
Warwickshire 
Gateway. 
 
Lodge Hill 
housing 
development  
Development of 
5,000 houses, retail 
centre, and related 
amenities (education, 
health, sports areas, 
open spaces and 
5,000 new jobs).  
Local community 
groups opposed to 
the Lodge Hill 
housing 
development. 
 
High speed 
rail network 
Phase 1 (London-
West Midlands) of 
STOP HS2 and local 
authorities 
 
Table 1
(HS2) High Speed 2 (HS2), 
railway. The route 
covers both urban 
and rural localities. 
participating in 51m. 
North 
Tyneside 
housing 
development 
(NE England) 
Development of 366 
executive houses, 
ancillary commercial 
unit and landscaping.  
The ‘Save Gosforth 
Wildlife Campaign’ 
and the West Moor 
Residents 
Association.  
 
Thameslink 
project 
The route runs from 
Bedford in the North 
to Brighton in the 
South through 
Central London. It 
covers both urban 
and rural localities. 
Local community 
groups in Lambeth. 
 
Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
Gateway 
Commercial 
development scheme 
around Coventry 
airport. 
Local community 
groups opposed to 
the Coventry 
Warwickshire 
Gateway. 
 
 
Table 2. The Defra Biodiversity Offsetting Metric (Defra, 2013). 
Value of 1 ha in ‘biodiversity units’ Habitat distinctiveness 
Low (2) Medium (4) High (6) 
Habitat quality Good (3) 6 12 18 
Moderate (2) 4 8 12 
Poor (1) 2 4 6 
 
Table 2
Appendix 1: Categories of interviewees and corresponding interview codes. 
 
Category of Interviewees Interview Code 
Conservation brokers CB 
Conservation scientists CS 
Environmental NGOs ENGO 
Consultants (ecologists) CE 
Central administration CA 
Local authorities LA 
Local community groups 
opposing the Coventry 
Warwickshire Gateway 
CG 
Local community groups 
opposing the Lodge Hill 
housing development 
LH 
Activists and local 
community groups 
participating in STOP HS2 
HS 
Local community groups 
opposing the North 
Tyneside housing 
development 
NT 
Residents participating in 
‘Hands off Thaxted’ group 
in Essex 
ES 
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